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Informational privacy is the ability to determine for yourself when
others may collect and use information about you and what they can do with
it.1 The dominant legislative and regulatory approach to ensuring adequate
informational privacy is Notice and Choice.2 This approach purports to
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. The classic source is ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also
JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL: HOW WE ARE SACRIFICING A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 3
(2007) (defining privacy “as the exercise of an authentic option to withhold
information on oneself”); Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1461, 1464 (2000) (“I will use ‘informational privacy’ as shorthand for
the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself”);
U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989) (“both the common law and the literal understandings of privacy
encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her
person”).
2. See Fred H. Cate, Director, Ctr. for Info. Priv. and Sec. at Ind. Univ. Maurer
Sch. of L., Presentation at The University of Hong Kong Privacy & Innovation,
In Pursuit of Right Incentives: The Limits of Notice and Choice (June 9, 2015)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Cate, The Limits of Notice and Choice]
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ensure an adequate degree of control over one’s information through the
presentation of a Notice (a statement of the terms governing the use of
information) and the requirement of a Choice (an action signifying
acceptance or rejection of the terms).3 Recent implementations of Notice and
Choice include the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation4
and California’s Consumer Protection Privacy Act.5 Over twenty years of
criticism conclusively confirm that Notice and Choice results in “the worst of
all worlds: privacy protection is not enhanced, individuals and businesses pay
(summarizing notice and choice approaches). Notice and Choice has its roots in
the formulation of the fair information practices in U.S. DEPT. HEALTH, EDUC.
& WELFARE, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (1973),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/records-computers-and-rights-citizens (formulating
the fair information principles in Section III). See also PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977),
https://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/; Fred Cate, The Failure of Fair
Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
INFORMATION ECONOMY 342 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) [hereinafter Cate, The
Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles; Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay
Hoofnagle, Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 357,
357 (2006) (outlining history of privacy protection and explaining changes that
could be made to the Fair Information Practices); U.S. DEPT. COMM., INTERNET
POL’Y TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE
INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK (2010), https://
www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2010/commercial-data-privacy-and-innovation-
internet-economy-dynamic-policy-framework; FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 2 (Mar. 2012),
https:www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recom
mendations/120326privacyreport.pdf; NAT’L ADVERT. ALL., Draft Code of
Conduct for Public Comment (2013), https://www.networkadvertising.org/
Draft_NAI_Code_For_Public_Comment.pdf.
3. See Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 2, at
352.
4. See European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L
119); European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, ch. 3, 2016 O.J.
(L 119). The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
does impose additional requirements beyond the minimal requirements of
Notice and Choice. See Gabriela Zahfir-Fortuna, 10 Reasons Why the GDPR Is
the Opposite of a ‘Notice and Consent’ Type of Law, FUTURE OF PRIVACY
FORUM, https://fpf.org/2019/09/13/10-reasons-why-the-gdpr-is-the-opposite-of-
a-notice-and-consent-type-of-law/ (last updated Dec. 17, 2020). The GDPR
nonetheless still requires, and relies heavily on, Notice and Choice. See id.
5. See S.B. 1121 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Leg., 2018 Cal.
Stat. Ch. 735.
2020] The Collective Control Alternative 175
the cost of bureaucratic laws.”6 An apt analogy is the old joke about the
drunk and the streetlight:
A policeman sees a drunk man searching for something under a
streetlight and asks what the drunk has lost. He says he lost his
keys and they both look under the streetlight. After a few minutes
the policeman asks if he is sure he lost them here, and the drunk
replies, no, that he lost them in the park. The policeman asks why
6. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, supra note 2, at 334.
An early and influential critique is Paul Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the
State, 22 CONN. L. REV. 815, 821–23 (2000) (Notice and Choice does not
ensure free choice because of information asymmetries, collective action
problems, limited rationality, and a lack of market options). A short list of
recent critiques includes: Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 74 n.4 (2018) (noting that the criticisms of Notice and
Choice are too numerous to list); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER,
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED
DISCLOSURE (2016); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem In
Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 545 (2014) (describing Notice
and Choice as Quixotic); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012) (outlining that notice
and choice as implemented is inconsistent with the requirements of free
choice); Ctr. for Digital Democracy & U.S. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., Letter on In
the Matter of a Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy
in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework For Businesses and
Policymakers 33 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_comments/preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-
era-rapid-change-proposed-framework/00338-57839.pdf (“Informed consent in
the digital marketing era requires . . . a new commitment to candor and honesty
. . . [the online marketing industry] needs to clearly explain to the user how the
data are collected and used”); Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to
Privacy Online, 140 DEDALUS 32, 36 (2011) (noting “the transparency paradox.
Achieving transparency means conveying information handling practices
[however] If notice . . . finely details every [relevant fact] . . . we know that it is
unlikely to be understood, let alone read. But summarizing practices in the style
of, say, nutrition labels is no more helpful because it drains away important
details, ones that are likely to make a difference,” and arguing for a much
greater reliance on context); Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice:
The Trouble with Notice and Consent, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENGAGING
DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON THE APPLICATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL ELECTRONIC INFORMATION 36 (2009), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2567409 (consumers “confront . . . full-on barriers to
achieving meaningful understanding of the practice and uses to which they are
expected to be able to consent.”); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, Notice
and Choice: Implications for Digital Marketing to Youth, BERKELEY MEDIA
STUD. GRP. 2–3 (2009), http://digitalads.org/documents/Schwartz_Solove_No
tice_Choice_NPLAN_BMSG_memo.pdf; RULE, supra note 1, at 143–47
(privacy advocates pay insufficient attention to how to balance privacy versus
competing concerns).
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he is searching here, and the drunk replies, “This is where the light
is.”7
Policy makers search under the streetlight of Notice and Choice even though
free and informed consent is not there—even though they know it is not
there. Why don’t they look in the “park”?
The problem is not that the “park” does not exist. There is a well-known
alternative to Notice and Choice suggested by reflection on the exchange of
information in social interactions.8 These exchanges typically exhibit the fol-
lowing striking feature: social norms ensure that people trust each other to
respect shared expectations about constraints on the information exchange.9
The nineteenth century sociologist of urbanization Georg Simmel was per-
haps the first to single out such shared expectations for systematic study.10
He emphasized that urbanization made it possible for a person to take on a
variety of social roles:
[W]hereas earlier [in small communities], individuality was deter-
mined primarily by belonging to a single group, it is now [in large
cities] formed by the combination of the diverse groups to which
the person belongs . . . Someone could belong to various profes-
sional associations, at the same time as he belongs to a scientific
society, is a reserve officer, plays a role in a civic association, and
in addition has a social life that brings him into contact with di-
verse social strata.11
It impressed Simmel that people conform to social norms that require that
information flows only in selective ways.12 That is why one could “come into
contact with diverse social strata” without much worry that information
about those activities would find its way back to, for example, the profes-
sional associations to which one belonged.13 Since Simmel, many have de-
veloped the point.14
7. Adapted from DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG: WHY EXPERTS KEEP FAILING US
40 (2010).
8. See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies, 11 AM. J.
SOCIO. 441, 441–42 (1906).
9. See id. at 452–56.
10. See id.
11. JERRY Z. MULLER, THE MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN MODERN EU-
ROPEAN THOUGHT 248–49 (quoting Georg Simmel, Gesamtausgabe in transla-
tion) (2002).
12. See Simmel supra note 8, at 466–69.
13. See id.
14. A short list includes: CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE
NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS (2002); CRISTINA BICCHIERI,
NORMS IN THE WILD: HOW TO DIAGNOSE, MEASURE, AND CHANGE SOCIAL
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Why have twenty years of criticism been so ineffective in turning the
tide from Notice and Choice to the collective control alternative? One plausi-
ble factor is that the criticisms detail the flaws but do not adequately motivate
the turn to collective control.15 A motivationally compelling critique would
show how and why the failure of Notice and Choice, properly understood,
reveals the undeniable need for the collective control alternative. That does
not yet exist in the Notice and Choice literature. My goal is to remedy that
lack.
Section I outlines Notice and Choice and explains its appeal. Section II
proposes three criteria of adequacy which an approach to informational pri-
vacy should meet. Section III argues that Notice and Choice fails to meet any
of the criteria and shows that the failure results from ignoring the role of
social norms. Section IV outlines a social norms/collective control alterna-
tive, and Section V urges the adoption of that alternative.
I. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND NOTICE AND CHOICE
The appeal of Notice and Choice is that it appears to solve two funda-
mental problems about informational privacy with one elegant stroke. I char-
acterize the problems then turn to the details of Notice and Choice.
A. Two Problems About Informational Privacy
Problems about informational privacy arise because contemporary sur-
veillance greatly reduces the control people have over information about
them.16 “Virtually every aspect of business is now open to data collection and
NORMS (2016) [hereinafter CRISTINA BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE WILD]; MOD-
ERN DILEMMAS: UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(Dylan Kissane & Alexandru Volacu eds., 2015); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRI-
VACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE
(2010); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 137; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ELINOR OS-
TROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
HOW CHANGE HAPPENS (2020); Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996); THE COMPLEXITY OF SOCIAL NORMS (Ma-
ria Xenitidou & Bruce Edmonds eds., 2014).
15. A typical example is Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and
Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 SUFFOLK UNIV. J. HIGH TECH. L.
370, 371 (2014). We critique Notice and Choice and recommend a collective
control alternative, but we do not show how the failure of Notice and Choice
itself motivates the turn to the collective control alternative. See id.
16. A short list of literature examining cotemporary surveillance issues includes
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019); YASHA LEVINE,
SURVEILLANCE VALLEY: THE SECRET MILITARY HISTORY OF THE INTERNET
(2018); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR
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often even instrumented for data collection: operations, manufacturing, sup-
ply-chain management, customer behavior, marketing campaign perform-
ance, workflow procedures, and so on.”17 That is both the cause and the
effect of the fact that “information—rather than information technology—is
the fundamental building material of the modern enterprise.”18 A significant
AN INFORMATION AGE (2018); JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST
FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEIL-
LANCE (2014); BEATRICE EDWARDS, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE
SECURITY STATE: SIX REASONS TO BE AFRAID (2014); GLENN GREENWALD,
NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEIL-
LANCE STATE (2014); LUKE HARDING, THE SNOWDEN FILES: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE WORLD’S MOST WANTED MAN (2014); Joel R. Reidenberg, The Data
Surveillance State in the United States and Europe, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
583, 605–06 (2014); HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, SPYING ON DEMOCRACY: GOVERN-
MENT SURVEILLANCE, CORPORATE POWER AND PUBLIC RESISTANCE (2013); SI-
MON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A NEW SOCIAL
CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY (Reprint ed.
2013); Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1956 (2013); ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER, UNAUTHORIZED AC-
CESS: THE CRISIS IN ONLINE PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SECURITY (2013);
WASH. POST, NSA SECRETS: GOVERNMENT SPYING IN THE INTERNET AGE
(2013) (audiobook); RONALD J DEIBERT, BLACK CODE: INSIDE THE BATTLE
FOR CYBERSPACE (2011); JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2012); SUSAN LANDAU,
SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY?: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW WIRETAPPING TECH-
NOLOGIES (2011); ATHAN THEOHARIS, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW COLD WAR
SURVEILLANCE AND SECRECY POLICY SHAPED THE RESPONSE TO 9/11 (2011);
JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/
11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008); LUIS ALBERTO FERNANDEZ,
POLICING DISSENT: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE ANTI-GLOBALIZATION MOVE-
MENT (2008); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelli-
gence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 911 (2008).
17. FOSTER PROVOST & TOM FAWCETT, DATA SCIENCE FOR BUSINESS: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DATA MINING AND DATA ANALYTIC THINKING 1
(2013).
18. JAMES W. CORTADA, INFORMATION AND THE MODERN CORPORATION x (2011).
Cortada notes that:
Today less than 20 percent of the workers in a computer plant make any-
thing; the rest are accountants, supply-chain supervisors, quality-control
specialists, production supervisors, managers, analysts, computer scien-
tists, and engineers. Banks do not have as much cash in their vaults and
branches as they did in earlier years; instead, they have digital files that
say they have large amounts of money, and they are managing information
about how much a particular person or account has, not physically moving
coins and paper from one pile to another. And so it goes in one industry
after another: hundreds of millions of people working with information.
They can do this reasonably well thanks to the existence of computers.
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part of that “building material” is information about consumers. As Harvard
Business School professor Soshana Zuboff notes,
Surveillance capitalism unilaterally claims human experience as
free raw material for translation into behavioral data. Although
some of these data are applied to product or service improvement,
the rest are declared as a proprietary behavioral surplus, fed into
advanced manufacturing processes known as “machine intelli-
gence,” and fabricated into prediction products that anticipate
what you will do now, soon, and later.19
This is problematic because an adequate degree of informational privacy
is essential to a wide range of important ends.20 “Theorists have proclaimed
the value of privacy to be protecting intimacy, friendship, individuality,
human relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development, creativity, inde-
pendence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, thought, democracy, rep-
utation, and psychological well-being.”21 As the mention of “intimacy,
friendship, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, [and]
self-development” indicates, a central theme is a concern with the self and its
relation to how others’ informational privacy affects those concerns because
different requirements on what one is allowed, expected, or required to reveal
or not reveal define different relationships with governmental authorities, ac-
quaintances, colleagues, friends, family, employers, and so on.22 As sociolo-
gist Christena Nippert-Eng emphasizes:
At its core, managing privacy is about managing relationships be-
tween the self and others. . . . privacy . . . [is] a “boundary regula-
tory process by which a person (or group) makes himself more or
less accessible and open to others.” When we regulate our accessi-
bility to others, though—including the accessibility of informa-
tion, objects, space, time, or anything else that we deem private—
we simultaneously regulate our relationships with them.23
Most commentators on information focus on the computers rather than on
information, facts, and data.
Id. at ix.
19. ZUBOFF, supra note 16, at 8.
20. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 98 (2008).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, The Self, the Stasi, the NSA:
Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the Surveillance State, 17 MINN. J. L.
SCI. TECH. 347, 370 (2016).
23. CHRISTENA E. NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 22 (2010) (quoting IRWIN
ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 31 (1975)).
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In light of these considerations, I take it for granted that it is essential to
restore an adequate degree of informational privacy, and, like Zuboff, he
urges that we reassert “the primacy of a flourishing human future as the foun-
dation of our information civilization.”24
Successful reassertion requires solving two problems. The first is to en-
sure that individuals have a sufficient range of opportunities to give free and
informed consent to what others do with data about them. Informational pri-
vacy consists of the ability to control what others do with information, and
you lack that control if you cannot, across a suitable wide range of cases,
give free and informed consent to how others process your information.
The second problem concerns tradeoffs. To successfully assert the “pri-
macy of a flourishing human future as the foundation of our information
civilization” one must balance the value of informational privacy against the
benefits of the data processing that defines that civilization. Information
processing has already yielded and will continue to yield significant bene-
fits.25 How much privacy can one afford to sacrifice to secure the benefits?
Reaching (or even approximating) societal consensus on an answer is a
daunting task. As sociologist James Rule notes, “we cannot hope to answer
[complex balancing questions] until we have a way of ascribing weights to
the things being balanced. And that is exactly where parties to privacy de-
bates are most dramatically at odds.”26 It is worth noting that disagreement
over privacy is just one instance of disagreement over “matters of fundamen-
tal significance.”27 As John Rawls emphasizes,
reasoned and uncoerced agreement are not to be expected . . . Our
individual and associative points of view, intellectual affinities
and affective attachments, are too diverse . . . to allow of lasting
and reasoned agreement. . . . [The appropriate view of social or-
ganization] takes deep and unresolvable differences on matters of
fundamental significance as a permanent condition of human
life.28
24. ZUBOFF, supra note 16, at 21.
25. See, e.g., Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Big Data and the “New” Privacy
Tradeoff, CHI.-KENT COLL. L. RSCH. PAPER NO. 2013-33, at 1–2 (Aug. 5,
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2306071.
26. RULE, supra note 1, at 183; cf. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 370 (“If privacy is to
receive its proper weight on the scales in any process of balancing competing
values, what is needed is a structured and rational weighing process, with defi-
nite criteria that public and private authorities can apply in comparing the
claims for disclosure or surveillance through new devices with the claims to
privacy.”).
27. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHILOSOPHY
515, 542 (1980).
28. Id.
2020] The Collective Control Alternative 181
B. The Allure of Notice and Choice
The allure of Notice and Choice is that it appears with one elegant
stroke to solve both the problem of ensuring free and informed consent and
the problem of implementing an acceptable tradeoff.
1. Free and Informed Consent
Advocates of Notice and Choice claim that as long as the Notice is
sufficiently informative, and the choice is sufficiently free, Notice and
Choice ensures that each individual gives or withholds free and informed
consent.29 As law professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove note, “[a]s
long as a company provides notice of its privacy practices, and people have
some kind of choice about whether to provide the data or not, then privacy is
sufficiently protected.”30
2.  Acceptable Tradeoffs
Part of the appeal of Notice and Choice is the—apparent—ease with
which it implements an acceptable tradeoff in the face of “deep and unresolv-
able differences on matters of fundamental significance.”31 To see the appeal,
note first that the overall pattern of giving or withholding consent draws a
line between consented to and unconsented to uses of information. Merely to
define that line is not necessarily to define an acceptable tradeoff. An accept-
able tradeoff adequately balances the benefits and risks to society as a whole.
But, at least in sufficiently competitive markets, in which businesses offer a
variety of information processing regimes, why shouldn’t individual consent
decisions sum to that balance (at least approximately)? If so, there is no need
to seek political agreement on what counts as an acceptable tradeoff, a daunt-
ing task given the widespread disagreement on the issue.
Some may object that proponents of Notice and Choice rarely address
the tradeoff problem.32 So, what ground is there to attribute the above view to
29. Sloan & Warner, supra note 15, at 370.
30. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 6, at 1.
31. See Rawls, supra note 27, at 542.
32. See, e.g., Orson Swindle, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swin-
dle in Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Market-
place A Report to Congress, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (May 2000), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-informa-
tion-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/swin-
dledissent.pdf. Commissioner Swindle sharply criticizes the report for its lack
of attention to tradeoff questions. See id. at 1–2. “The Privacy Report fails to
pose and to answer basic questions that all regulators and lawmakers should
consider before embarking on extensive regulation that could severely stifle the
New Economy. Shockingly, there is absolutely no consideration of the costs
and benefits of regulation; nor the effects on competition and consumer choice;
nor the experience to date with government regulation of privacy; nor constitu-
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them? One reason is that (with one notable exception33) the only tradeoff
mechanism one finds in the Notice and Choice literature is the combined
effect of the individual consent decisions. For further confirmation, recall the
Schwartz and Solove claim that “As long as a company provides notice of its
privacy practices, and people have some kind of choice about whether to
provide the data or not, then privacy is sufficiently protected.”34 Privacy is
not “sufficiently protected” unless Notice and Choice ensures an acceptable
tradeoff. Otherwise, privacy is under protected by a tradeoff that sacrifices
too much privacy to information processing or over protected by a tradeoff
that sacrifices too much information processing to privacy.35
II. THE ALLURE AND THE ILLUSION: CRITERIA OF
ADEQUACY
The allure of Notice and Choice is an illusion. Three questions make the
inadequacies clear. When is consent informed? When is it free? When is a
tradeoff acceptable? The discussion of each question leads to a criterion of
adequacy that Notice and Choice fails to meet.
A. When Is Consent Informed?
The point of ensuring that consent is informed is to provide the informa-
tion necessary for a person to make a reasonable decision. It follows that
consent is informed when a person has enough information to make such a
decision. The question is: What type of information? There are two types:
information a person acquires through his or her own investigative efforts
and the information that a business adheres to relevant social norms.36
tional implications and concerns; nor how this vague and vast mandate will be
enforced.” Id. at 16.
33. See WESTIN, supra note 1, at 365–70 (proposing ways to implement tradeoffs
that go well beyond mere Notice and Choice).
34. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 6, at 1 (emphasis added).
35. In his excellent book Privacy in Peril, James Rule seems in the end to endorse
the claim that the combined effect of informed consent decisions yields an ac-
ceptable tradeoff. He recommends that in “the private sector [the following]
precept should apply: no use of personal data for institutional surveillance
without meaningful informed consent from the individual.” RULE, supra note 1,
at 196. Rule notes that this precept would alter the existing tradeoff between
privacy and a variety of competing concerns, and he endorses the change. See
id.
36. Relevant social norms are generally the merchant norms such as those found in
the Uniform Commercial Code’s Implied Warranty of Merchantability, U.C.C.
§ 2-314 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977). Information acquired
through one’s own investigative efforts will vary based upon things such as the
relative price of the good purchased and an individual’s proclivity to research
purchases or not. See, e.g., Howard Marmorstein et al., The Value of Time
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To illustrate both, suppose Victoria is purchasing an air purifier. For the
moment, imagine a Mid-Twentieth Century transaction without significant
data collection. There are features of the product she can readily determine
through examining the description of the product and the context in which it
is offered. These include price, color, size, weight, and whether it has a
HEPA filter, the area it covers, and so on. On the basis of her examination,
Victoria forms reasonable expectations about which products meet her re-
quirements. There are other features of the product which she cannot readily
assess through her individual investigation. For example, will the product
work properly? More precisely, will it be fit for the purposes for which an air
purifier is ordinarily used?37 How is she to learn that? She knows very little
about the design and manufacture of air purifiers. Even if she had the exper-
tise, she does not have the time to investigate. She is already committed to a
variety of goals—raising her daughter, pursuing her career, enjoying her
friends, and so on—and the time she is willing to allot to buying an air puri-
fier is short. Instead of investigating, she relies on a social norm. The norm is
that manufacturers provide and retailers sell products fit for the purpose for
which they are ordinarily used. The practice arose with the rise of market
economies in the seventeenth century.38 In light of the norm and widespread
conformity to it, Victoria’s expectation that manufacturers and retailers con-
form to the norm is empirically reasonable. Her expectation is also norma-
Spent in Price-Comparison Shopping: Survey and Experimental Evidence, 19
J. CONSUMER RSCH. 52, 52 (1992).
37. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 79 (noting that “one of the major
themes of the roundtables is that consumers lack understanding of various data
practices and their privacy implications, and thus lack the ability to make in-
formed decisions about the trade-offs involved”). See also Jeff Chester, Cookie
Wars: How New Data Profiling and Targeting Techniques Threaten Citizens
and Consumers in the “Big Data” Era, in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: IN
GOOD HEALTH? 53–77 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2012) (analyzing and ex-
plaining trends in use of consumer information for individual-level advertising
targeting purposes, typically beyond consumer notice).
38. The practice has a long history. As British common law responded to the rise
of a market economy in the seventeenth century, it explicitly noted that the
commercial custom and practice was to offer fit products. See JAMES OLDHAM,
ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 98 (2004). Moreover, such
acknowledgments are not confined to modern market economies; ancient Ro-
man law also notes the same custom and practice. See Friedrich Kessler, The
Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J.
262, 263–64 (1974). See also George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1299–1302 (1981) (explaining history
of modern warranties and how exploitation theory was popular reasoning for
them).
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tively reasonable in the sense that consumers, manufacturers, and retailers
share values in light of which they endorse and conform to the norm.39
To summarize, she has two sources of empirically and normatively rea-
sonable expectations. Those expectations ensure that her consent is informed.
Consent is informed when a person has enough information to make a rea-
sonable decision, and the information relevant to her decision is that the
product will conform to her reasonable expectations.40
Some may object that standard form contracts governing the purchase of
products routinely disclaim liability from the failure of the products to be fit
for the purpose for which they are ordinarily used. Doesn’t that show that
Victoria cannot reasonably expect the air purifier to be fit for the purpose for
which an air purifier is ordinarily used? The answer is that the penalty for not
offering such products is a market, not a legal, penalty. In a sufficiently com-
petitive market, the penalty for producing more than the occasional unfit
product is lost sales (over time as buyers become aware of the practice), so
profit-motive driven sellers will offer fit products—for the most part.41 When
contracts shift the legal risk of selling an unfit product onto the buyer, that
does not eliminate the market penalty.42 What the shift does is fine-tune the
fitness norm’s risk allocation in ways that benefit both businesses and con-
sumers. Businesses benefit because no production process is perfect. There
will be some unfit products on the market, but these will be relatively rare.43
The effect is to reduce a business’s legal liability and make it more predict-
39. Shared values do not always generate reasonable expectations. They do not do
so when the values are open to decisive criticism. Consider, for example, a
society in which widely shared values support expectations that women are
inferior to men. The expectations the values that generate them are empirically
and morally indefensible. In such cases, the expectations are not reasonable. In
the text, for simplicity, I assume that values are empirically and morally defen-
sible. Avoiding the assumption would require a more complicated formulation
of the claims in the text.
40. See Richard Warner, Turned On Its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable
Terms in Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3–4
(2008).
41. Id.; see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information In Markets
For Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69
VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983).
42. In other words, the market penalty is the difference in profits from selling an
undesirable product as opposed to a legal penalty, which would be one imposed
by law. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 41, at 1392–93.
43. See id. at 1407 (assuming that in a model chance of breaking is known).
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able.44 The benefit to consumers is that, in a sufficiently competitive market,
the resulting savings will to some extent be passed on to consumers.45
There are many similar examples.46 People routinely form reasonable
expectations based on social norms. Social norms explain why you trust the
quality of the car mechanic’s work, the accuracy of the pharmacist filling of
prescriptions, the edibility of the food in restaurants, and so on. In general,
there are
social norms about nearly every aspect of human behavior. There
are norms about littering, dating, smoking, singing, when to stand,
when to sit, when to show anger, when, how, and with whom to
express affection, when to talk, when to listen, when to discuss
personal matters, when to use contractions, when (and with re-
spect to what) to purchase insurance.47
Now set Victoria’s transaction in the Twenty-First Century. The differ-
ence is that businesses collect, analyze, and distribute information about her.
Can Victoria’s consent be informed by forming reasonable expectations
about those information processing activities? She cannot form them through
her own investigation. She does not have access to the information process-
ing practices of businesses. She does have access to privacy policies, terms
of use agreements, and terms of sale agreements, but those will not generate
the necessary expectations. There are three problems.
First, the documents are too long and too numerous to read. “When
PayPal’s privacy notice is added to its other terms of use disclosed to con-
sumers, the total word count is 36,275 words, longer than Hamlet (at 30,066
words), and iTunes’ comes to 19,972 words, longer than Macbeth (at 18,110
words).”48 The number of documents compounds the problem. A 2008 study
that considered only privacy policies (not terms of use or terms of sale) notes
that “[w]e estimate that reading privacy policies carries costs in time of ap-
44. See id. at 1408.
45. This may seem bad for risk-averse buyers and buyers facing unusually high
risks who want more protection, but they can easily protect themselves by
purchasing insurance or extended warranties, both of which are typically read-
ily available at reasonable prices. On the other hand, consider what happens
when sellers do promise that a product is fit in the contract. Sellers will most
likely raise prices to cover the additional legal liability. This is bad for low-risk
buyers who have little or no need for the additional protection. Those buyers
pay for the protection they do not need, thereby subsidizing protection for risk-
averse and high-risk buyers. Disclaiming the fitness warranty avoids the sub-
sidy. See Warner, supra note 40, at 16–17.
46. See, e.g., Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable Software: Product-
Risk Norms and the Problem of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J. TECH. L.
POL’Y 45, 64 (2012) (analyzing norms governing the sale of products).
47. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 914.
48. Cate, The Limits of Notice and Choice, supra note 2, at 6.
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proximately 201 hours a year, worth about $3,534 annually per American
Internet user.”49 Nationally, if Americans were to read online privacy policies
word-for-word, we estimate the value of time lost as about $781 billion annu-
ally.”50 In 2020, the number of documents a consumer encounters is far
greater than it was in 2008.51 Some have suggested shorter, easy to read No-
tices,52 but, as Fred Cate notes,
Experiments with ways of making notices more accessible, in-
cluding shortened notices, layered notices, standardized notices,
and machine readable notices, have tended to fail in practice, in
large part because they ignore the fundamental complexity of the
myriad uses of data that notices are trying to describe and the legal
liability that can result from inadequate or inaccurate
descriptions.53
Second, Notices do not contain all the information Victoria needs. If she
is, through her individual investigation, to form expectations to guide her
choice, she needs to know what information businesses collect, how they use
it, and where they distribute it. However, as Helen Nissenbaum notes,
consider what might need to be conveyed to users to provide no-
tice of what information is captured, where it is sent, and how it is
used. The technical and institutional story is so complicated that
probably only a handful of deep experts would be able to piece
together a full account . . . Even if, for a given moment, a snapshot
of the information flows could be grasped, the realm is in constant
flux, with new firms entering the picture, new analytics, and new
back-end contracts forged: in other words, we are dealing with a
recursive capacity that is indefinitely extensible.54
Nissenbaum concludes that “the complexity makes it not only difficult to
convey what practices are followed and what constraints respected, but prac-
tically impossible.”55
Third, even if she could form expectations, they would not qualify as
reasonable. In the sense of “reasonable” as relevant here, reasonable expecta-
49. Aleecia M. Macdonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543, 565 (2009).
50. Id.
51. Sarah Shyy, The GDPR’s Lose-Lose Dilemma: Minimal Benefits to Data Pri-
vacy & Significant Burdens on Business, 20 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 137, 145
(2020).
52. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere),
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1032–33 (2012).
53. Cate, The Limits of Notice and Choice, supra note 2, at 6.
54. Nissenbaum, supra note 6, at 35–36.
55. Id. at 36.
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tions are those endorsed by the shared values of consumers and businesses.
The problem is that the relevant shared values do not exist (at least not in
sufficient numbers). Consider the media conglomerate Viacom. It builds “au-
dience segmentation models based on viewing data, demographic and psy-
chographic profiles, purchasing behavior data and more. [This allows it to]
mine Nielsen’s all-minute respondents to identify audience segments, then
design and implement strategies to target them.”56 Do the data subjects share
values with Viacom in light of which the subjects and Viacom agree on what
counts as reasonable expectations for the data subjects in regard to Viacom’s
information processing? That is unlikely. Only some will know what Viacom
is, and even fewer will be aware of its information processing. But even if
they were aware, the intense privacy debates over the use of predictive ana-
lytics would be sufficient to show that there is no agreement on relevant
shared values.
These same considerations show that Victoria cannot rely on a social
norm to create reasonable expectations. The relevant social norm would be
defined in terms of reasonable expectations. The “fit for ordinary use” norm
illustrates this point.57 The norm is that consumers reasonably expect and
businesses provide products fit for ordinary use.58 The analogous norm for
information processing would be that consumers reasonably expect a certain
type of information processing, and businesses conform to that expectation.
Therefore, the first criterion of adequacy: ensure that social norms gen-
erating relevant reasonable expectations exist, and that businesses conform to
the norms.
B. When Is Consent Free?
Law professor Margaret Jane Radin offers a useful characterization of
when consent is free.59 Free consent “requires [1] a knowing understanding
of what one is doing [2] in a context in which it is actually possible for one to
do otherwise, and [3] an affirmative action in doing something, rather than a
merely passive acquiescence in accepting something.”60 An example is help-
ful. Suppose a thief puts a gun to your head and demands, “Your money or
your life!” When you hand over your money, you have a knowing under-
standing of what you are doing. It is also possible for you to do otherwise—
keep your money and be shot. But, if anything is a case of passive acquies-
cence, handing over the money is. To what extent are online interactions like
56. Use Audience Analytics to Predict and Identify Patterns in Audience Behavior,
SAS (2015), https://www.sas.com/content/dam/SAS/en_us/doc/solutionbrief/
audience-analytics-107006.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
57. See Warner & Sloan, supra note 46, at 60–62.
58. See id.
59. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75
IND. L.J. 1125, 1126 (1999).
60. Id.
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the gun to the head example? The answer leads to the second criterion of
adequacy.
To begin, imagine Roger visits Amazon.com to buy a book. He has a
knowing understanding of what he is doing, and “it is actually possible [for
him] . . . to do otherwise.”61 He could buy books from Barnes & Noble’s
website or not buy books online at all. The critical question concerns the
final condition: Is his visit to Amazon’s website “an affirmative action in
doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting
something”?62 It may look like an affirmative action. After all, Roger would
not engage in this exchange if he did not judge that the service was worth
more to him than withholding his data, and if he chooses because he finds the
service worth more to him than not disclosing his data, how can the action be
mere passive acquiescence?
The problem is that the same remarks are true for the gun to the head
example. You would not hand over your money if you did not think the
money was worth more to you than losing your life. Defenders of Notice and
Choice might reply that there is nonetheless a significant difference between
the gun to the head and Roger’s visit to Amazon.com. In the gun to the head
case, you have only one meaningful option: hand over your money. Roger,
however, appears to have several options. He does not have to shop on Ama-
zon. The problem is that a variety of retailers does not translate into a variety
of relevant options.63 The relevant options are just two: (1) engaging in trans-
actions subject to information processing; or (2) not engaging in such trans-
actions at all.64 As Schwartz and Solove contend,
the “choice” presented is more of a Hobson’s choice than a real
one. Many companies present consumers with a take-it-or-leave-it
choice that provides hardly any ability for consumers to bargain
about their privacy preferences. If a consumer wants to buy a
product, read a website, subscribe to a magazine, use a service,
and so on, the consumer can be forced either to surrender privacy
or to go elsewhere. But when nearly all companies offer the same
take-it-or-leave-it approach, consumers desiring to protect their
privacy have nowhere to turn.65
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 6, at 3.
64. Id.
65. Compare id., with Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Recon-
struction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1229 (1983) (“The consumer’s experience
of modern commercial life is one not of freedom in the full sense posited by
traditional contract law, but rather one of submission to organizational domina-
tion, leavened by the ability to choose the organization by which he will be
dominated.”). Id.
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Roger’s choice is a highly constrained choice—a choice limited to a choice
among various information processing regimes.
Does it follow that his choice is mere passive acquiescence? No. Even
highly constrained choices can in some cases still be free. This point plays a
key role later in the critique of Notice and Choice. To illustrate the idea,
imagine your dream vacation is to go to the Cayman Islands. Your budget
makes the trip impossible unless you opt for an “all inclusive” vacation pack-
age offering airfare, hotel, and food at a price you can afford. When you sit
down to eat the food, your choice is highly constrained (your options being
going hungry or spending money you cannot afford). However, eating the
food is also consistent with your reasonable expectations about the all-inclu-
sive package. Contrast the gun to the head example. The thief’s interference
is not consistent with the reasonable expectations you had about the pursuit
of your plans and projects. This difference explains why you eat the food
freely—the sense that doing so is a justified component of a freely chosen
overall plan. This is a common pattern. You may, to take another example,
have no practical option other than driving your children to daycare. You
have to work—there is no one to care for them at home—and so on. But
driving them to daycare is part of the pursuit of the freely adopted project of
raising your children and as such it is not passive acquiescence but an affirm-
ative action. In general, a constrained choice can be free when the control
one surrenders to others will be used in ways consistent with one’s reasona-
ble expectations.
Thus, the second criterion of adequacy: ensure free choice by ensuring
that constrained choices about information processing are consistent with
reasonable expectations.
C. When Are Tradeoffs Acceptable?
Zuboff rightly insists on the assertion of the “primacy of a flourishing
human future as the foundation of our information civilization.”66 An “infor-
mation civilization” is characterized by significant degree of information
processing for a variety of purposes.67 However, realizing “a flourishing
human future” means securing a significant degree of informational privacy
for individuals.68 Thus, asserting the “primacy of a flourishing human future
as the foundation of our information civilization” means balancing the value
of informational privacy against the benefits of the data processing that de-
fines that civilization. When is a tradeoff acceptable? I take it for granted that
social and political processes settle that normative question by generating
shared values about what counts as an acceptable tradeoff. As variations
across cultures and throughout history show, different groups find different
66. ZUBOFF, supra note 16, at 21.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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tradeoffs acceptable.69 The determination of what counts as an acceptable
tradeoff provides part of the background against which one assesses the rea-
sonability of consumer expectations. Expectations are not reasonable if they
conflict with the tradeoffs defined through appropriate and legitimate social
and political processes.
The third criterion of adequacy: ensure an acceptable tradeoff.
III. THE FAILURE OF NOTICE AND CHOICE
Notice and choice meets none of the criteria of adequacy. The reasons
for its failure reveal the need for the collective control alternative.
A. The First Criterion: Ensure Reasonable Expectations Exist
Notice and Choice attempts to use Notices to generate reasonable ex-
pectations.70 The attempt fails. To begin, it fails to generate expectations at
all—reasonable or not.71 The simple and obvious problem is that people do
not read Notices.72 Unread Notices cannot create expectations.73 Some may
object that contract law regards people as informed even if they do not read
contracts.74 The doctrine of the duty to read deems a party to know the terms
of the agreement even if he or she did not read it—as long as a party has an
adequate opportunity to read and understand the agreement.75 Why not han-
69. See Rawls, supra note 27, at 542.
70. See Nissenbaum, supra note 6, at 34.
71. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Pro-
tecting Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 113–14
(2008).
72. See, e.g., id. With regard to standard form contracts generally, “[t]he fact that
consumers do not read standard form contracts is so well accepted and docu-
mented as to be virtually enshrined as dogma within the contracts literature.”
Wayne Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV.
227, 237 (2007); see also Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would
Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 839 (2006).
73. RADIN, supra note 6, at 96–98. In her book, Boilerplate, Radin argues that only
actual knowledge can fulfill the “knowing understanding” requirement. She
concludes that visitors’ consent is not free on the ground that non-reading visi-
tors have only hypothetical knowledge of the terms in Notices. Id.
74. See Barnes, supra note 72, at 245–46.
75. This is a traditional formulation of the duty to read. “One having the capacity
to understand a written document who reads it, or, without reading it or having
it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature.” 7 JOSEPH PERILLO, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 29.8 (rev. ed. 2002). When one looks at the exceptions to the
doctrine, as stated, it is clear that the actual rule is one is bound if one has
adequate opportunity to read and understand.
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dle the fact that people do not read Notices in the same way? Why not treat
consumers as having the expectations they would have if they read Notices?
This will not do. The first criterion of adequacy requires that people actually
have expectations. The reason is that only actual expectations guide choices.
Hypothetical expectations only guide hypothetical choices.
Put aside the problem of generating expectations. Grant that Notices do
so. Presenting Notices still does not ensure reasonable expectations. The
only condition that Notice and Choice imposes on Notices is that they con-
tain sufficient information about a business’s information processing prac-
tices.76 It does not require that the expectations the Notices create should be
reasonable.77 Defenders of Notice and Choice could reply that one should
regard expectations as reasonable if they are consistent with an acceptable
tradeoff between privacy and information processing, and thus, the process
that ensures acceptable tradeoffs also ensures that Notices create reasonable
expectations. Subsection C below critiques and rejects Notice and Choice as
a process for reaching acceptable tradeoffs.
B. The Second Criterion: Ensure That Constrained Choices are Still
Free
Notice and Choice does not address this problem at all. It assumes that
people have a relatively unconstrained choice in a sufficiently competitive
market.78 As Marc Rotenberg notes, Notice and Choice “imagines the crea-
tion of perfect market conditions where consumers are suddenly negotiating
over a range of uses for personal information.”79
C. The Third Criterion: Ensure an Acceptable Tradeoff
The Notice and Choice tradeoff claim is that if each person gives free
and informed consent to the tradeoffs that are acceptable to that person, the
overall result is a reasonably close approximation to a society-wide accept-
able tradeoff.80 It is unlikely that this is true. Two examples support the
claim—one fictional; the other, real. For the fictional example, imagine a
community that does not have a telephone book although everyone would
like to have one. Everyone wants that even if he or she has to be listed in the
book. However, each prefers not to be listed. When asked to consent to being
in the book, each person refuses. No one considers the possibility that so
many people will refuse to be listed that the book will not see the light of
day.
76. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 6, at 1.
77. See id.
78. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Pri-
vacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001).
79. Id.
80. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 6, at 1.
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The “no phone book” result is a negative externality—a cost of a deci-
sion that falls on third parties but not directly on the parties making the deci-
sion.81 The telephone book example shows that when significant negative
externalities are present, summing individual decisions can lead to unaccept-
able results. The real life example is the story of railway transportation to and
from Ithaca, New York, a story that prompted the economist Alfred E. Kahn
to write his famous article, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Fail-
ures, Imperfections, and the Limits of Economics.82 The last passenger train
left Ithaca, New York in 1961.83 Faced with the decision to travel by car, bus,
air, or train, so many choose car, bus, or air that train service was no longer
profitable and the railroad ceased to offer it.84 Unfortunately, the train was
the only reliable form of transportation in snowy winter weather and in sum-
mer peak traffic conditions when roads were crowded and airfares
expensive.85
The shutting down of the train service was a negative externality. As
Kahn observes:
[L]et each traveler or potential traveler have asked himself how
much he would have been willing to pledge regularly over some
time period, say annually, by purchase of prepaid tickets, to keep
rail passenger service in Ithaca. So long as the amount he would
have declared (to himself) would have exceeded what he actually
paid in the period—and my own introspective experiment shows
it would—then to that extent the disappearance of passenger ser-
vice [ ] was an incident of market failure.86
The lack of train service was unacceptable to most of those affected, yet
people making their travel decisions ignored the negative externality.87
Compare informational privacy. An acceptable tradeoff between privacy
and information processing is a negative externality. To see why, consider
that an acceptable tradeoff has to balance society-wide long-term effects.
Further, consider the information required to adequately balance the benefits
and risks in information about complex society-wide consequences unfolding
over a long period of time. That information is not available to people mak-
81. For an intuitive discussion of externalities, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE
MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, AND WHAT TO MAKE OF IT
147–65 (2002) (discussing externalities as “spillovers”).
82. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfec-
tions, and the Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23, 25–29 (1966).
83. Ithaca (New York), WIKITRAVEL, https://wikitravel.org/en/Ithaca_(New_York)
(last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
84. Kahn, supra note 82, at 25.
85. Id. at 26.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 29.
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ing decisions about entering transactions, so they could not take the informa-
tion into account even if they tried.88 Like the telephone book and Ithaca train
cases, Notice and Choice is subject to a negative externality that ensures it
will lead to unacceptable tradeoffs.
IV. BEYOND NOTICE AND CHOICE
Notice and Choice fails because it ignores the role of social norms in
creating reasonable expectations. Instead, it envisions people giving or with-
holding consent independently of knowledge of what others are choosing and
without any mechanism of coordination with them. It is time to turn to the
collective control alternative. I outline a version of that alternative. My goal
is to indicate a direction for development, not to present a fully argued
theory.89
An example illustrates fundamental themes. Family relations are a con-
venient illustration even if the ultimate concern is with commercial and gov-
ernmental relations. Imagine a large congenial extended family where
everybody shares the goal of a harmonious holiday dinner. Harmony requires
a selective flow of information. Everyone knows, for example, that there are
things you can say to Aunt Jane that you cannot say to Uncle John and vice
versa. In general, they all know that they all share more or less the same
understanding of what the relevant strictures on concealment and disclosure
are. No family member can unilaterally realize the goal of harmonious family
relations. Members must coordinate their efforts to observe the harmony-
creating constraints.
Family members conform to a norm—in the following sense of a norm.
A norm is a behavioral regularity in a group, where the regularity exists at
least in part because almost everyone thinks that he ought to conform to the
regularity.90 The regularity in the family holiday dinner is acting to ensure a
88. See Nissenbaum, supra note 6, at 35–36.
89. Robert Sloan and I have worked out an approach in SLOAN & WARNER, supra
note 16, at 59–60, 84–86, 343 and ROBERT H. SLOAN & RICHARD WARNER,
THE PRIVACY FIX: HOW TO PRESERVE PRIVACY IN THE ONSLAUGHT OF SUR-
VEILLANCE (forthcoming, 2021).
90. Our notion of a norm is a standard one in recent law and economics literature,
with one exception. We explain conformity to the norm by appeal to people’s
beliefs above what they ought to do. The recent literature in contrast explains
conformity as the result of self-interested actors avoiding the costs of noncon-
formity. “[One] approach typically assumes that people care only about their
own (material) well being, and rely on repeated game models to explain how
they cooperate or refrain from violating social norms. . . . [A] second approach
typically assumes that people care about something else aside from material
goods—esteem, or status, or conformity, or some such thing.” Eric A. Posner,
Introduction to SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW xi–xii
(Eric A. Posner ed., 2007). Richard McAdams, a proponent of the second ap-
proach, notes that “by norm I mean a decentralized behavioral standard that
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certain selective flow of information. The regularity exists because family
members think they ought to conform to realize the goal of family
harmony.91
Similar social norms govern a wide range of social, commercial, and
governmental interactions, as Simmel, Nissenbaum, Nippert-Eng, and others
have emphasized.92 The difficulty is that consumers and businesses do not
share values that generate relevant reasonable expectations.93 A reasonable
public policy is to create the complex of shared values and social norms that
ensure the existence of reasonable expectations on which free and informed
consent depends. To motivate that approach, I conclude this section by out-
individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow . . . [to gain the
esteem of others], or because the obligation is internalized, or both.” Richard
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, in SOCIAL
NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW, supra at 101, 144. The empha-
sis on “feeling obligated” would appear close to our view that people conform
because they think they ought to; however, McAdams explains “feeling obli-
gated” in terms of the costs of non-conformity—thus: “Without internalization,
one obeys the norm to avoid external sanctions. . . . After internalization, there
is yet another cost to violating a norm: guilt. The individual feels psychological
discomfort whether or not others detect her violation.” Id. McAdams still con-
ceives of people as self-interested agents seeking to avoid costs that they regard
as unacceptable. We take it to be clear that people are not merely self-interested
agents. The assumption that they are has been extensively and decisively criti-
cized. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 32–33 (2009).
91. Family members conform if they think enough others will. That feature makes
the family norm a coordination norm. A coordination norm is a behavioral
regularity in a group to which people conform because they think they ought to
do so if others do. BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE WILD, supra note 14, at 11.
92. See Simmel, supra note 8, at 448, 481, 489; Nissenbaum, supra note 6, at 45;
NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 23, at 22.
93. See discussion supra Section II.A. There is another problem in addition to lack
of norms. Some norms may be inconsistent with shared values. The classic
example is the “no helmet” norm among National Hockey League players. See
T. C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A
Study of Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 381
(1973). Before 1969, not wearing a helmet was a behavioral regularity that
existed in part because each player thought he ought to conform—as long as
all the others did. Id. Wearing a helmet meant not looking tough and involved a
slight loss in peripheral vision. Id. However, each player would have happily
worn a helmet if he thought almost all the others were going to. Id. Because of
the value they placed on avoiding head injuries, virtually all the players re-
garded the alternative in which they all wore helmets as better justified. Id.
Thus, the no-helmet norm was not value-optimal. But the players remained
trapped in it, because no individual player would wear a helmet as long as he
expected most others not to. Id. For examples involving informational privacy,
see SLOAN & WARNER, supra note 16, at 61–62.
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lining how norms based on shared values ensure informed and free consent
as well as an acceptable tradeoff.
Informed consent: As long as people know their interactions are gov-
erned by relevant social norms, the norms will generate the reasonable ex-
pectations on which informed consent depends.
Free consent: The constrained choices involved in transactions are still
free as long as adherence to social norms creates conditions under which the
constraints are consistent with reasonable expectations.
Acceptable tradeoffs: Informational norms implement tradeoffs between
the value of privacy and the benefits of information processing. They permit
some information processing and thus secure some of the benefits, but they
protect privacy by allowing only certain processing. Thus, legitimate social
and political processes that yield appropriate social norms also implement
acceptable tradeoffs.
V. LOOKING IN THE “PARK”
Social norms are the “park” in which regulators should look for ways to
preserve and promote information. As Cass Sunstein notes, “[f]ar too little
attention has been played to the place of norms in human behavior and to the
control of norms as an instrument of legal policy.”94 The time to remedy that
lack of attention is now. The critique of Notice and Choice makes it clear that
the right public policy is to create a complex of shared values and social
norms that generate reasonable expectations.
94. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles 4 (Univ. Chi. L. Sch. Work-
ing Paper No. 36, 1996), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2622525.
